In this empirical analysis of voting patterns in five countries on days when one or more national referenda were held, voter turnout appears to decline in the number of concurrent referenda, in contrast to standard theories' predictions and regardless of method used to hold constant the quality of the referenda. Multiple concurrent referenda imply "quantity discounts" as one may vote on more ballots in one visit to the polling station. They should also draw more voters due to the wider range of interests attracted when more issues are up for vote. Yet, none of this seems to happen in the data. More recent developments, such as rule-utilitarian and information-based theories of voting, fare similarly poorly in light of the evidence presented in this article; a social theory of voting does better.
I -Introduction
Look at Figure I . It displays a naïve regression of voter turnout on the number of national referenda held on the same day, a total of 383 instances of direct democracy, of which 279 are from Switzerland, 36 from New Zealand, 25 from Ireland, 22 from Australia, and 21 from Italy. These votes, were taken between 1889 and 2014, 199 of them are single-ballot days and 90 of the remaining 184 instances are days on which two referenda were held simultaneously.
(The highest number of concurrent referenda in the sample is twelve, from Italy.) The figure indicates that, contrary to standard theoretical predictions, holding more than one referendum on the same day fails to attract higher turnout. While only a naïve regression, the gist of its message withstands the addition of standard control variables and ways of holding constant the quality of the referenda, and is robust across countries.
Voter turnout is an important issue for a variety of reasons. The tiny chance of casting a pivotal ballot has long attracted interest in why rational individuals vote at all, and who decides to vote plainly impacts the outcome of a referendum. Standard theories of voter turnout utilize a "calculus of voting" in which the individual compares the costs of voting to the expected benefits of doing so. A vast literature has resulted from this approach; if more individuals perceive a vote to be more important, they should be more likely to vote; better access to the polls should similarly increase turnout by lowering voting costs, etc. (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Farber, 2010; McMurray, 2013; Lyytikäinen and Tukiainen, 2013; Andersen et al, 2014; Herrera and Morelli, 2014) .
These theories also predict that an individual is more likely to vote when he can cast multiple ballots at a time. For instance, a multitude of concurrent referenda is apt to attract a wider span of interests than is a stand-alone referendum, and should therefore get higher turnout. In addition, the same stroll to the polling station (or post box in the case of postal voting) influences more issues on days of multiple concurrent referenda. Section IV below adds a more detailed theoretical treatment. On its face, the relationship depicted in Figure I is akin to quantity discounts being associated with the purchase of fewer products in the market.
In spite of all the interest in voter turnout, estimates on the effects of concurrent votes tend to come from elections, not referenda, and turnout in elections is typically found to rise in the presence of more ballots (see, e.g., Fauvelle-Aymar and François, 2015, who utilize a peculiarity in French local elections that lets some voters in a constituency vote in a departmental and a regional election; or see Geys, 2006 , for a review).
Focusing on referenda therefore adds a novel dimension to the empirics of voter turnout.
Referenda may treat issues like defence and helmet laws whereas all elections have a strong partisan element. Elections are therefore less likely than referenda to change the composition of groups with a high stake in the result. If many people vote mainly to please their peers, who (because of the high stakes) punish non-voters at a cost, the contrasting empirics on turnout between referenda and elections may be explained by group-level free-riding as the probability that an abstainer also belongs to a different group increases the more concurrent referenda there are. If another group can carry out the costly punishment, nobody punishes anyone and abstainers escape scot-free. Section IV below will discuss this (tentative) explanation in greater detail.
The rest of this article proceeds as follows: data and institutional background are treated in the next section, whereupon Section III presents the main results, which corroborate the testimony of the introductory regression. Section IV discusses how different explanations of turnout, established ones and variations on them, fare in the face of these results, and elaborates on the group-based free-riding explanation mentioned above as a potential way of making sense of the empirical findings. Section V concludes.
II -Data and Institutional Background
Referenda are common in political decision-making on a wide variety of issues across the world, but multiple concurrent referenda on the national stage occur less frequently. Table I provides summary statistics on the five countries studied in this paper: Australia, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, and Switzerland 2 . There are very few instances of multiple concurrent national referenda other than these. Average turnout in the sample is almost unfailingly lower for multiple concurrent referenda than for single ones, except in Ireland, whose median turnout figure deviates slightly (Australia differs on both measures only because ten out of the 14 observations of multiple referenda are from after it introduced compulsory voting in 1924; the same share for its stand-alone referenda is four out of eight).
Turnout is measured as the votes cast divided by the total number of eligible voters. On days of multiple concurrent referenda, turnout may vary across ballots, in which case the highest turnout is chosen to represent all the referenda held on that day (however, the variation is never greater than a fraction of a percentage point and usually zero). voting ever significantly affected Swiss turnout rates. Partly for this reason, Section III spends some time comparing the effect of compulsory voting on turnout rates in Switzerland to Australia and Italy. The conclusion is that compulsory voting significantly increases turnout in Italy and Australia, but has no effect on Switzerland, indicating that Swiss estimates should assume no compulsory voting.
III -Main Results
The regression model that is of interest in what follows retains the definitions of variables introduced in the preceding section and is of the following type:
where is an idiosyncratic variable. Table II , 2006) , that a narrower referendum attracts more voters (due to the greater chance of being pivotal, or perhaps due to more intense campaigning efforts).
More interestingly, the coefficient on the number of referenda is always negative. A squared term is also included, since the strong hint from the figure introducing this article is that turnout declines most strongly between the first and second referenda. Consistent with this observation, the squared term is always positive. To complement these two variables, a dummy, Two or More Referenda, is also constructed, which groups every voting day of more than one referendum together and takes the value one for multiple concurrent referenda.
These results show that higher turnout is not associated with "cheaper" voting, in the ways standard theories of turnout define "cheap". So far, what is less clear is whether there is a move in the opposite direction that is statistically different from zero. The specifications in Table II which assume Switzerland's history of compulsory voting to be relevant uniformly for Switzerland is below two (some of the common findings for election turnout -e.g. Blais,
2000 -suggest about ten percentage points), and is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Estimates excluding the Swiss sample are exhibited in Table IV . Since a large share of the sample comes from Switzerland, many of with the full sample and Victory Margin as a regressor has fewer observations from New Zealand but yields similar results.
The results so far suggest that voters have a tendency to eschew "quantity discounts" in referenda, which is puzzling considering their popularity elsewhere. Either there is something about the referenda that share a voting day, or there is something about the sharing itself, that lowers turnout. If the first case is true, it would imply that the present findings are due to weak identification. In the second case, voters, in contrast to established theories of turnout, are put off by the presence of multiple referenda. A post-referendum survey that has been conducted in Switzerland since 1981 asks roughly 1,000 individuals, both voters and abstainers, about the importance for them personally of the most recent instance of direct democracy 5 . These data suggest that it is indeed the sharing itself that reduces turnout.
Importance is here measured by the fraction of respondents rating a referendum as maximally important on a ten-point scale (using the average score instead does not greatly alter the results). In cases of multiple concurrent referenda, the most important one of them serves as the rating for all, since they are held on the same day and one can just ignore those referenda one deems less important (the correlation coefficient between this measure and the 5 The survey is part of a series called "VOXIT" and can be found online: http://fors-nesstar.unil.ch/webview/index.jsp. A different way of holding constant the quality of referenda is to control for the issues they deal with. The database stores this information in a rough but useable fashion by attaching key words to each referendum. In Table VI , the five most frequently occurring issues (there is a total of 161 distinct issues), listed in the table, are used as control variables. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the five most frequently occurring issues is voted on concurrently with another of the five in Switzerland, indicating that the authorities wish to keep separate the most commonly voted-on issues; together they constitute 121 voting days out of 279 (the number of different issues is otherwise quite closely correlated with the number of concurrent referenda with a correlation coefficient of around 0.8). Each of these variables has a mean of around three and a median of two or three with respect to the total number of referenda held concurrently on the day.
Again, these controls fail to find evidence that voter turnout should rise with the number of concurrent referenda. In unreported alternative specifications with as many as the 15 most frequently occurring issues, the coefficients do not change though the number of variables somewhat reduces the statistical significance. Notice, however, that while the issues do capture a similarity of topics of referenda, it remains possible that referenda of the same topic are nevertheless perceived as unequally important.
The main reason for supposing that uninteresting referenda should be grouped together is that this would save the authorities having to organize a referendum for which there will be very little turnout. The results fail to corroborate such an "economizing" hypothesis. Another fact also argues against it; between 1889 and 2014, the average number of days on which referenda were held in Switzerland was 2.258 per year. If the economizing hypothesis were true, it seems it should be easy to economize much more by reducing the mean well below two. After all, if many referenda are not too important, they could wait half a year longer to be voted on and save significantly on the costs of arranging referenda. 
IV -Discussion
The evidence presented in the preceding section indicates that voter turnout does not increase in the number of concurrent referenda, and gives some reason to suppose that the actual relationship is the opposite. The "obvious" explanation that unimportant referenda may be grouped together does not fare well in the subsamples for which citizens' perceived importance, or the topics of the referenda, can be added as a control variable. This section examines some potential reasons that might explain why established theories fare so badly in these data.
One explanation says that media space is scarce and that much information pertinent to the ballots consequently does not reach voters when many concurrent referenda are approaching; news reports on different referenda "crowd out" one another. This explanation is consistent with the fact that the rate of decline in turnout appears to peter out the more numerous are the referenda, akin to how one referendum might (depending on how space is allocated) lose half of its media space ahead of a double-referendum, whereas twin referenda both lose a third of their space if the twin turns into a triplet, etc. However, the media-based explanation is at odds with the finding that turnout generally increases for multiple concurrent elections, where similar media constraints ought to apply. In addition, it is not at all clear why media space would not expand when, controlling for their perceived importance, many referenda are approaching.
Some might argue the opposite: that voters face "information overload" in the presence of multiple concurrent referenda, but then one must also argue that voters somehow do not realize that they can "roll-off" (i.e. vote on some of the concurrent referenda, but abstain on those ballots they deem less interesting). One must also explain why information overload should happen already ahead of twin referenda and then proceed at a slower rate for triplets, etc., when the rate of decline in turnout should more likely increase in the number of concurrent referenda, if voters really faced too much information.
Among more established theories of voter turnout, none is supported by the present findings.
Indeed, even if turnout had been found to be clearly unaffected by the number of concurrent referenda, established theories would still have been at a loss for an explanation. Expressive theories of voting predict that the greater variety in issues associated with more numerous referenda being held concurrently should attract a similarly greater variety of people interested in expressing approval or disquiet -or simply "good citizenship" or otherwise an attachment to some outcome, which does not seem to happen in the data.
Theories of instrumental voting also predict increasing turnout in the number of concurrent referenda. This is because the benefit derived if an individual's preferred option wins likely varies across referenda, so if more referenda are held concurrently the chances increase that one of them should be very important. Additionally, the ability to vote for several proposals for the same shoe-leather cost should also raise turnout.
Information-based theories of voting also fare poorly. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996; 1999), and McMurray (2013) argue that uninformed voters abstain in order to strategically allow better-informed citizens to make choices for them 6 . But on days of multiple referenda, more people ought to be informed about at least one issue that is up for vote than on days of just one referendum. If the strategic incentive were a significant factor in getting out the vote, one would expect different concurrent referenda to attract somewhat different groups. This should increase turnout though many blank votes might be cast.
A different strand of voting theory deviates from methodological individualism by holding that people vote out of a sense of "ethical" (rule-utilitarian) obligation to their group (e.g. Harsanyi, 1980; Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006) . Essentially, theories of this kind argue that voting decisions are based on individuals' reaching an optimal voting probability when the objective is to maximize group welfare. However, an individual, call him A, should revise upwards this probability in the presence of additional referenda being voted on concurrently, since the influx of voters due to the additional referenda means that a greater share of voters do not care about A's issue (they are there for other ballots). Not knowing which way these other voters will vote on the ballot that he cares about, A sees the influx as an addition of noise to the outcome. This makes the outcome less certain and therefore makes his vote more likely to be pivotal 7 .
If established theories of voting cannot explain the present findings, what can? Every economic explanation of turnout must in some way be traceable to the "calculus of voting" (Downs, 1957; Becker, 1958; Tullock, 1967) , which essentially takes the individual as the unit of analysis and asks what incentives he faces. There are some features of the data presented in this article which cautiously suggest that theories of turnout be amended by a version of a "social incentives"-type explanation (e.g. Gerber et al., 2008; Funk, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 2014) . The following provides the outline of such a model.
1. An issue that is up for vote will interest certain groups in the sense that they have high stakes in the outcome.
2. Group formation is exogenous to referenda.
3. Within groups, peer discipline pressures members to vote, although individual members would prefer not to vote since voting is costly and unlikely to affect outcomes. If a member is found not to have voted, the discoverer must punish him or be punished himself if found out. Punishment is apt to be informal and idiosyncratic, e.g. cancelled squash games, a moratorium on dinner invitations, or other ostracism.
4. The probability that more groups will have a stake in the outcome of a referendum increases in the number of referenda. Having multiple group memberships enable other groups to carry out the costly punishment, giving rise to a "prisoner's dilemma" when all punishers want to free ride on other groups' punishment. If punishers do not know whether a suspected non-voter also belongs to other groups, the probability that he does increases in the number of groups involved in a voting day.
Steps 1 and 2 above are innocuous enough; ceteris paribus, it is plain that more groups are mobilized when more issues are up for vote. Nor is the assumption of exogenous group formation heroic; even in Switzerland, where referenda are legion, there are hardly ever more than four days on which referenda are held per year. Not every group will be interested in every referendum, and the ability to predict what future issues will be voted on when forming new social ties is profoundly unrealistic. This also rules out individuals' exerting effort to join multiple groups purely in the hope of avoiding punishment.
As for
Step 3, peer discipline within groups has been found to work to establish pro-social behaviour on the basis that non-punishment is cause for punishment when peers keep auditing one another indefinitely (see Ostrom, 1990, and Levine and Modica, 2016) .
Step 4 is sure to hold when multiple group membership is hard to ascertain, but even when this does not apply one can nevertheless argue that other groups should carry out the costly punishment. In either case, a non-voter has an easier time avoiding peer pressure the more groups have a stake in the outcomes of a voting day.
For those who belong to at least one group, voting thus yields utility of the form
where > 0 is the individual's benefit of voting (instrumental, expressive, or other), < 0 is the cost of voting (time, shoe-leather, general dreariness of politics, etc.), < 0 is the expected punishment for abstention, and is the number of eligible punisher-groups (i.e.
groups in which is a member), where ≫ 0 (e.g. ( ) = −100 -recall that < 0, so the derivative would indeed be strongly positive), since belonging to only two groups suffices to enable the "prisoner's-dilemma" outcome. Thus, an individual votes if + > ( ) ⁄ .
For discovering punishment, the analogous decision is
for punisher , where ℎ ( ) is a function that increases in the number of potential groups of which the suspected non-voter is a member, whose first and second derivatives are both positive.
Otherwise the notation is the same as above.
Notice that individuals may vote even if + ≪ 0, if the expected punishment is sufficiently strong. Those who enjoy voting will do it eagerly irrespective of how high the punishment is. Those who dislike voting will do it grudgingly when the punishment is severe enough. Since the benefits and costs are defined generally, the present voting calculus can be seen as extending upon established theories of turnout that compare costs and benefits associated with voting. Essentially, the only thing that is done here is to add ( ) ⁄ as a cost of not voting to the individual's "calculus of voting". It could be appended to an established turnout model, such as the classic Downsian calculus, whose predictions would then remain unchanged on the proviso that the number of concurrent referenda be held constant.
A numerical example may prove illustrative: if a group of five has an interest in the outcome of a referendum, and there is another group of five, three of whom also belong to the first group, that is concerned with a second referendum, the double referendum would mobilize two groups, or seven individuals. If these individuals know that the group-level free-riding described above will let them off the hook, only four of the seven individuals will vote (two from each group), and the intersection (the three dual-membership individuals) will abstain. Two stand-alone referenda, by contrast, would have turned out five people out of seven. More generally, the first set of voters may be thought of as those who would vote on a day of − 1 concurrent referenda, with the second set being the group mobilized by the th referendum. As long as the intersection is (believed to be) greater than half of the influx of voters, adding a concurrent referendum will decrease turnout. This implies that the present explanation is consistent with various possible rates of decline in turnout as the number of concurrent referenda increases, and is illustrated in Figure II .
This explanation is consistent with the observation that concurrent elections increase turnout if the added election does not bring additional groups into play (or does, but without sufficient overlap with other groups). Or, to put the condition in other words, if groups (farmers, motorists, teachers, homosexuals, etc.) are about as concerned with national policy as with state or local policy, or if a main motivation to vote is partisanship or ideological affiliation. In this case, there would be no added reason to abstain from voting, and the traditional reasons for turnout to increase would apply.
If the social-incentives-and-group-based-free-riding explanation is correct, turnout should also decline by less in places and at times when turnout for referenda is lower in general. This is because the smaller is one group (or set of groups) that "care" about an issue up for vote, the lower are the chances of overlap with added groups; if there is but one group with a stake in the outcome per referendum, chances are higher that they will overlap in concurrent referenda the bigger they are. Some suggestive but weak evidence that this might happen is presented in Table VII .
Assuming that turnout varies over time for reasons unrelated to the proposed explanation, periods of unusually low turnout should have less negative, or even positive, coefficients on the multiple-referenda variables than other times. Similarly, the coefficients should be most strongly negative in times of unusually high turnout. Table VII compare the magnitude of the negative effect on turnout of multiple concurrent referenda across countries. As was shown above, turnout is far higher in Australia and New Zealand than in any of the other countries, which average rather similar turnout rates. The regression results shown in Table IV revealed the decline in turnout from multiple concurrent referenda to be greatest in Australia, in line with the hypothesis, but then no clear relationship can be found with the other countries and New Zealand disagrees sharply. The small number of observations for these countries makes it difficult to say more. 
V -Conclusion
The main contribution of this article is to document some highly puzzling evidence on voter turnout. A second contribution is to relate the evidence to some plausible and established theories of voter turnout, and see how they fare. Since they fare poorly, a third and somewhat more tentative contribution is to suggest a variation on social incentives to vote as a potential explanation which (so far) seems broadly consistent with the data as well as with somewhat more crude tests of its implications.
The estimates provided by the regression analyses in this article suggest that turnout decreases by about two or three percentage points in a twin referendum compared to a single referendum, and that the rate of decrease declines in the number of additional referenda. The same sign appears across different times and countries, although the sizes of the effects vary and are not unfailingly statistically different from zero, which, however, would still be at odds with established theories of voting.
Since established theories of voting predict that turnout increases in the number of concurrent referenda, these results are profoundly puzzling for them. A potential explanation which is broadly consistent with the present observations holds that many individuals privately find voting too costly but vote anyway because they fear even costlier intra-group discipline. If multiple referenda attract more groups, it is likely that their memberships intersect, which induces punishers to free-ride on other groups and can also make punishment costlier, thereby letting abstainers off the hook.
